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INTRODUCTION: THE CONFLICT OVER THE RULE OF LAW 
This symposium asks how we can quantify and evaluate what 
judges do. Some of the papers are skeptical of attempts at 
quantification.1 These questions are of importance to legal historians, 
who frequently seek to link judicial behavior to larger cultural, 
economic, and political trends. This essay suggests some ways that one 
might quantify and thus measure an important and central issue for 
legal historians: how did appellate judges define, work with, and alter 
the “rule of law”? 
DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW IN ANTEBELLUM 
JURISPRUDENCE 
In 1856, four years after Uncle Tom’s Cabin,2 Harriet Beecher 
Stowe despaired at the fortunes of the antislavery forces. Though many 
people throughout the country had wept upon reading of Tom’s death 
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 1.  See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, The Costs of Judging Judges by 
the Numbers, LEGAL WORKSHOP (DUKE L.J., Feb. 25, 2010). 
 2.  HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (Mary R. Reichardt ed., Ignatius 
Press 2009) (1852). 
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at the hands of Simon Legree at the end of the novel, the abolitionists 
had seemingly won few converts to their cause. The end of slavery 
seemed as far away as ever. A majority of politicians, voters, and judges 
supported the ideas that fugitive slaves must be returned to their 
owners, that Congress should refrain from interference in the 
institution of slavery, and that a utilitarian calculus of the costs of 
abolition and the benefits of slavery favored the continuation of 
slavery. Especially in the courts, the rhetoric that this nation must 
uphold the rule of law and return fugitive slaves to their owners—and 
otherwise support the law of slavery—proved compelling. Stowe 
wondered why this was: how could people feel the inhumanity of 
slavery and yet uphold the slave law? Her novel, Dred: A Tale of the 
Great Dismal Swamp, addressed adherence to the rule of law by judges, 
politicians, and religious leaders, and thus offered something of an 
answer.3 
One important subplot of Dred derived from North Carolina 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Ruffin’s 1829 opinion in State v. Mann.4 
In that case, Ruffin freed Mann from criminal liability for abusing a 
slave in his custody.5 Yet Ruffin acknowledged that the decision he had 
made was a hard one. He wrote of the conflict he felt between his 
feelings and his duty as a magistrate. “The struggle,” Ruffin observed 
in the first paragraph of the opinion, “in the Judge’s own breast 
between the feelings of the man, and the duty of the magistrate is a 
severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside such questions, 
if it be possible.”6 Yet, he told his readers he had to issue a decision 
against liability. “[I]t is criminal in a Court to avoid any responsibility 
which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance therefore it is done, 
the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the 
dominion of the master over the slave in North-Carolina.”7 Ruffin 
emphasized that the master (or possessor in this case—Mann had 
rented the slave he abused) must have uncontrolled authority over the 
body of the slave. “The power of the master must be absolute, to render 
the submission of the slave perfect,” Ruffin grimly observed.8  
 
 3.   HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, DRED: A TALE OF THE GREAT DISMAL SWAMP (Robert 
S. Levine ed., Penguin Books 2006) (1852). 
 4.  State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829). 
 5.  Id. at 268. 
 6. Id. at 264. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 266. 
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Judge Ruffin’s honesty caught the attention of Stowe and of other 
abolitionists, too, for they realized that Ruffin had exposed the difficult 
truth at the heart of the law of slavery. And they exploited Ruffin’s 
honesty. Stowe wrote in 1853, in the nonfiction A Key to Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, that she was sorry that “such a man, with such a mind, should 
have been merely an expositor and not a reformer of law.”9 She came 
to the conclusion that Ruffin was not a reformer because judges 
followed legal logic: “[i]t is often and evidently not because judges are 
inhuman or partial but because they are logical and truthful, that they 
announce from the bench in the calmest manner, decisions which one 
would think might make the earth shudder and the sun turn pale.”10 It 
was the cold logic that led to so many perverse conclusions: “Every act 
of humanity of every individual owner is an illogical result from the 
legal definition . . . . The decisions of American law-books show 
nothing so much as this severe, unflinching accuracy of logic.”11 
Stowe explored this adherence to legal logic in more depth in 
Dred. In that novel, she constructed a fictional judge, Justice Clayton 
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, who was antislavery in private, 
yet issued a proslavery decision.12 The decision Stowe put into the 
fictional Justice Clayton’s hands almost exactly replicated the text of 
State v. Mann. The morning before Justice Clayton issued his decision, 
he spoke with his wife about it. When she asked why he was ruling in 
favor of the abuser, he said “[a] Judge can only perceive and declare. 
What I see, I must speak, though it go against all my feelings and all 
my sense of right.”13 Although antislavery advocates were unhappy 
retreating to the terms of legalist logic, this behavior was a recurring 
theme of the antebellum judiciary.14  
Stowe seemed perfectly willing to concede that there is something 
of a common-law method of legal logic and that applying that logic—
which included a utilitarian calculus of the costs and benefits of a rule 
that protected slaves against abuse—yielded proslavery results. 
Proslavery literature often advocated such analysis. For instance, 
 
 9.  HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, A KEY TO UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 79 (Boston, John P. Jewett 
& Co. 1853) (emphasis omitted). 
 10. Id. at 82. 
 11. Id. 
 12. STOWE, supra note 3, at 16. 
 13. Id. at 350. 
 14.  See, e.g., STOWE, supra note 9, at 104 (discussing State v. Mann). 
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Thomas R.R. Cobb’s An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery15 
combined two lines of thought. First, a historical interpretation of 
slavery made it seem close to universal and also humane. For instance, 
Cobb argued that enslaved people produced more and often led better 
lives than free workers. Under Cobb’s worldview, slavery was better 
for the slaves, as well as their owners. The second line of thought held 
that judges should decide cases according to principles of logic and law, 
which he believed were distinct from passions favoring slaves. Those 
principles were based often on the seeming ubiquity of slavery and on 
its purported utility as well. There was a strong sense, even among 
abolitionists, that the law was proslavery and that abiding by the rule 
of law would yield a proslavery result.16 
Yet others interpreted the meaning of “the law” differently. They 
did not think that the law was so firmly proslavery as did Ruffin or 
Cobb. For instance, Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1852 speech in Concord, 
Massachusetts against the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 expressed 
surprise at the number of law books that seemed to contemplate 
introducing natural justice—what was commonly called at that time the 
“higher law.” Emerson read the legal literature as supporting—rather 
than opposing—a doctrine of “higher law,” which had been so heavily 
criticized by legal thinkers: 
 
 15. THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (Univ. of Ga. Press 1999) (1858). 
 16.  The first part of Cobb’s treatise (“An Historical Sketch of Slavery”), id. at xxxv–xxxvii, 
was grounded in the extensive literature on the contemporary practice of slavery. Cobb’s 
utilitarian argument about the necessity of slavery and the impracticality of emancipation suggest 
that his scholarship was an early form of legal realism. These arguments appeared in many places 
in Southern legal writing, including in Georgia Supreme Court Justice Ebenezer Starnes’s novel, 
The Slaveholder Abroad, which included an appendix comparing crime rates in slave and free 
states. See EBENEZER STARNES, THE SLAVEHOLDER ABROAD 465–512 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1860). The focus on proslavery empiricism came just as antislavery writers also 
turned toward empiricism. Thus, William Goodell’s The American Slave Code in Theory and 
Practice looked to the law as it was on the books (proslavery) and in operation (even more 
proslavery). See WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(Negro Universities Press 1968) (1853). 
The latter part of Cobb’s treatise develops the law internally, but he draws upon the historical 
sketch when discussing comity. He suggests that slavery is so ubiquitous that it exists before and 
without positive law and that states should, therefore, recognize the property rights of 
slaveholders traveling through free jurisdictions. COBB, supra note 15, at 168–71 (critiquing 
Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.), for its origins in excitement and sentiment 
rather than legal logic and concluding, “{w}ithout desiring in any manner to disparage the 
deservedly great reputation of the great jurist that delivered this opinion, it is nevertheless 
unquestionably true, and so admitted by his biographers and eulogists, that a prominent defect in 
his character was a want of that moral courage (that my Lord Coke possessed in such an eminent 
degree) that could withstand every influence when the law demanded his obeisance”)).  
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A few months ago, in my dismay at hearing that the Higher Law 
was reckoned a good joke in the courts, I took pains to look into a few 
law-books. I had often heard that the Bible constituted a part of every 
technical law library, and that it was a principle in law that immoral 
laws are void.  
  I found, accordingly, that the great jurists, Cicero, Grotius, Coke, 
Blackstone, Burlamaqui, Montesquieu, Vattel, Burke, Mackintosh, 
Jefferson, do all affirm this. I have no intention to recite these 
passages I had marked: such citation indeed seems to be something 
cowardly (for no reasonable person needs a quotation from 
Blackstone to convince him that white cannot be legislated to be 
black), and shall content myself with reading a single passage. 
Blackstone admits the sovereignty “antecedent to any positive 
precept, of the law of Nature,” among whose principles are, “that we 
should live on, should hurt nobody, and should render unto every one 
his due,” etc. “No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this.” 
“Nay, if any human law should allow or enjoin us to commit a crime” 
(his instance is murder), “we are bound to transgress that human law; 
or else we must offend both the natural and divine.”17 
Out of these conflicting viewpoints emerged serious discussion of 
what “the rule of law” meant and the origins of law in positive 
legislation, in the long-term customs of people around the world, and 
in natural moral sense. Despite the frequent invocations of it by judges, 
we still have a difficult time deciding whether a decision represents the 
rule of law—or something else, like the rule of sentiment. 
Among legal historians in particular, there has been surprisingly 
little consideration of the quantifiable aspects of the question of just 
what “the rule of law” means and how to measure whether judges 
adhere to the rule of law. Yet some of the key questions that legal 
historians have asked about judges’ behavior are susceptible to 
quantitative exploration. In particular, I am interested in how to 
measure what “the rule of law” means and in how expressions of 
ideology may be measured in judicial opinions. I will discuss below 
several examples of how to begin to do this. 
 
 17. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Fugitive Slave Law, in 11 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 178, 190 (Edward Waldo Emerson ed., 1903) (emphasis omitted). 
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I. ASSESSING JUDGES: HISTORY’S METHODS 
Legal historians frequently view judges as dependent variables—
as gauges of larger intellectual and cultural movements, or, 
alternatively and more rarely, as gauges of how cultural movements do 
not penetrate law. Perhaps because legal historians have focused so 
much attention on law as an artifact of culture (Lawrence Friedman’s 
American Law in the 20th Century18 comes to mind here), they have 
had relatively little concern for the assessment of whether judges are 
good at what they do. Thus, instead of focusing on judges as 
autonomous individuals, they analyze judges’ output as it is affected by 
external factors, like ideology, culture, and economy. 
In some models, judges (and judges’ opinions) may be the vehicles 
for implementing changes impelled by economic and cultural thought. 
One tradition sees judges as reshaping law to promote positive 
economic results.19 Some of Richard Posner’s earliest work, in which 
judges are more or less fungible, provided a quantitative assessment of 
the changes in nineteenth-century tort law.20 The same is true for more 
recent work in economic history, like Jenny Wahl’s The Bondsman’s 
Burden: An Economic Analysis of the Common Law of Southern 
Slavery,21 which treats judges as a homogeneous group as it reveals the 
economic orientation underlying Southern law across forty years of 
opinions. 
In each of those instances, there is an account of judges remaking 
the law. But there is no sense of whether they have made those changes 
according to the rule of law or on an ad hoc basis. Nor is it clear which 
judges do this well and which poorly: even when judges are the 
independent variables who remake law to promote economic growth, 
we have little sense of judges themselves—they do not emerge as 
individual actors. Instead, the judiciary appears as an undifferentiated 
group of men. One can read for pages in Professor Morton Horwitz’s 
Transformation22 and in Professor William Novak’s The People’s 
Welfare,23 both books centered on common-law adjudication, without 
 
 18. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2002). 
 19. See, e.g., MORTON J, HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860 (1977). 
 20.  Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
 21. JENNY BOURNE WAHL, THE BONDSMAN’S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY (1998). 
 22. HORWITZ, supra note 19. 
 23. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH 
CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
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seeing the name of any judge. Judges, despite their differing political 
and religious orientations, and their differing skills and training, are 
seemingly interchangeable. 
Historians have sometimes looked closely at what judges 
contribute as independent actors, though even in these instances the 
picture often emerges that judges are vehicles for expression of their 
culture. We hear about individual judges through biographies, which 
are the legal historians’ form of “thick description.” Yet such a massive 
work of judicial biography as Professor Kent Newmyer’s Supreme 
Court Justice Joseph Story24—brilliant legal history as it is—threatens 
to lose the larger story in the details of individual cases and arguments 
around them. Thick descriptions may, nevertheless, help provide a 
reasonable level of generalization about how judges reason.25 For 
example, Judge Posner’s jurisprudential biography of Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo26 and Richard Polenberg’s Cardozo biography27 focus on 
Cardozo’s ideas without getting lost in so much detail of the lives of 
judges. Along those lines, collective biographies, like Professor G. 
Edward White’s The American Judicial Tradition and, more recently, 
Professor Timothy Huebner’s Southern Judicial Tradition, employ a 
similar methodology that focuses on ideas in opinions.28 
While one is talking about “thick description” and analysis of 
judges in history, one book stands out. Among the leading legal-history 
studies of the last several decades that deal with judges and judicial 
methods is Professor G. Edward White’s Marshall Court and Cultural 
Change.29 It links the decisions of the Marshall Court to larger trends 
in American culture, which emphasized the value of the union and the 
 
 24.  R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE 
OLD REPUBLIC (1986). 
 25. Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial 
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1554 (2009); H. Jefferson Powell, A Response to Professor 
Knight, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1727 (2009) (focusing on the desire for generalization and empiricists’ 
ability provide it). 
 26.  RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990). 
 27. RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO: PERSONAL VALUES 
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1997). 
 28. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (2d ed. 1988); TIMOTHY 
HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION (1999); see also Richard A. Posner, Judicial 
Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502, 520 (1995) (“{T}he obvious alternative to studying the judge’s 
life is studying his opinions.”); A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 
1821 (2009) (suggesting that studying judges’ opinions is a more useful way to understand judicial 
behavior than conventional biography). 
 29. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835 
(1988). 
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promotion of economic growth. White views Marshall’s opinions as 
important supports for those missions. He does this through a 
comparison of Marshall’s opinions with other key cultural expressions, 
such as James Fenimore Cooper’s novels.30 The question remains, 
though, whether there are some quantitative tools that scholars can 
employ to bring more precision to judicial decision-making. 
II. ASSESSING JUDGES: QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
Because of the nature of questions that legal historians have asked 
in recent years, they have rarely made wide-ranging assessments of 
judges’ quality or of their adherence to key principles, like the rule of 
law (or even what people might mean by it). Perhaps, though, a 
systematic, quantitative approach can bring more precision to the two 
key issues: how judges operate (that is, how they find and use 
precedent, and how they write opinions) and what determines (or at 
least correlates with) outcomes.31  
Maybe we can begin to understand and measure the quality of 
judges with some assessment of their peers’ assessments (in part by 
citations and maybe also by how often they are mentioned by name in 
opinions). Or we may look to the energy judges expended on their jobs: 
in terms of the number of opinions they write; their longevity on the 
court; the length of their opinions; and the number of their 
concurrences and dissents.32  
Further, one might look to their learning and aspirations: what 
cases they cite, how far afield to they look for sources of law, how often 
they reach beyond their own jurisdiction’s opinions. One might even 
consider whether they look to other countries’ opinions, or beyond 
readily available treatises, and even to non-legal sources. There are 
other ways to try to tease out judges’ aspirations, such as how often 
they use key phrases. A search for these phrases might reveal examples 
of judges’ creativity in language. For instance, a search for 
“Daguerreotype” (an early form of photography) reveals how quickly 
 
 30. Id. at 40–48 (1988). G. Edward White’s The American Judicial Tradition makes a similar, 
though broader, claim about the centrality of certain principles (like the rule of law) to American 
judges throughout history. 
 31. Knight, supra note 25, at 1554. 
 32. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias 
(As a Means to Reduce Bias), 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279 (2007). 
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mid-nineteenth-century judges adopted allusions to the new 
technologies of their era—to light, darkness, and natural right.33 
There are, yet, some finer distinctions a quantitative legal history 
might make in terms of assessing the project of judging. As the vignette 
with which I began this Essay illustrates, persistent questions remain 
about what it means to judge according to the rule of law. And so I 
would like to see some quantitative precision brought to the 
exploration of whether judges abide by the rule of law. 
I would like to suggest two places in particular that we might 
attempt to bring quantitative precision to understand the meaning of 
“the rule of law.” First, I hope to return to Professor Robert Cover’s 
ground: of judges who interpreted the proslavery nature of the 
common law and the Constitution. Cover’s key question in Justice 
Accused: Anti-Slavery and the Judicial Process34 was why judges who 
were antislavery in private issued proslavery opinions. The answer 
turns on a constellation of arguments, which the judges themselves 
advanced, about the meaning of the Constitution and about the utility 
of a proslavery interpretation to the preservation of the Union. These 
arguments appeared in Fugitive Slave Act cases, as well as in state cases 
interpreting the rights of enslaved people who traveled with their 
owners to free states and then back into slave states, and in cases 
interpreting slaveowners’ wills that attempted to free their enslaved 
property. We need to graph them over time: how frequently were they 
invoked, how central were they to the result, and which opinions were 
subsequently cited? Moreover, what are the geographic, temporal, and 
factual determinants of a conclusion that the utility of slavery trumped 
considerations of the humanity of individual slaves? That is, in what 
states and when did judges refer to the utility of slavery? In what kinds 
of cases did they reference the utility of slavery? This would bring 
 
 33. There were several references to Daguerreotype images in the years before the Civil 
War. See, e.g., Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495, 505 (1850) (construing the exchange of 
Daguerreotypes as evidence of promise to marry); Maddox v. Simmons, 31 Ga. 512, 531 (1860) 
(Lumpkin, J.) (noting that Judge Harris’ opinion, which was reprinted at the end of Judge 
Lumpkin’s, “will daguerreotype to posterity the peculiarities of our most excellent brother far 
better than any post-mortem eulogy of ours” (emphasis omitted)); Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga. 146, 
157 (1847) (“ Is not, I ask, the transfer from Lichton to Dixon & Lichton the Daguerreotype 
likeness of the one prohibited . . . ?”); Tritt v. Crotzer, 13 Pa. 451, 454 (1850) (“{T}here are cases 
in which the law is portrayed by a daguerreotype from nature and feeling, and approved by the 
impulses of a sound conscience; and does not result from abstractions of positive institute, found 
and established in a different and incongruous state of society . . . .”). 
 34. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
(1975). 
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greater precision to what judges meant by “the rule of law” in fugitive-
slave cases. 
Second, I suggest matching the reasoning styles of judges across 
similar cases at a similar time as a more ambitious piece of a project to 
quantitatively gauge the ways that political ideology linked to judicial 
opinions.35 For example, William W. Fisher has suggested that Whig 
political theory predominated in vested-rights cases in the years 
between the Revolution and the Civil War.36 To investigate this claim, 
one could compare the political affiliations of judges against the 
appearance of Whig or Democrat doctrine in their opinions. Whigs, for 
instance, viewed expansively the contracts that corporations made with 
the government and argued that an expansive contracts-clause 
jurisprudence was necessary to protect investments in corporations and 
encourage technological and financial progress.37 Democrats, by 
contrast, invoked arguments about the inalienability of certain 
governmental powers, like the right of eminent domain. Particularly 
helpful are cases in which there are dissents, which highlight the 
disjunction between reasoning styles.38  
There are two things to focus on in this analysis of Whig and 
Democrat judges. First, we need to look at the reasoning styles of 
judges, not just the outcomes. And, closely related to that, we need to 
develop systematic ways of measuring rhetoric in judicial opinions to 
assess reasoning styles. This may bring more precision to judicial 
reasoning styles than a “yes/no,” or “agreement/disagreement” 
variable.  
A lot of data is buried in the hundreds of volumes of state and 
federal case reports before the Civil War. It is awaiting the systematic 
 
 35. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt 
to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1905 (2009) 
(noting the difficulty of disentangling judges’ views on ideology from their views on law). As 
Judge Edwards and Professor Livermore note, some factors are quite difficult to code for. When 
these factors appear, studying judicial rhetoric in conjunction with citation patterns appears more 
promising. 
 36. William W. Fisher, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private 
Property: 1760–1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 112–20 (1990) (detailing Whig styles of reasoning).  
 37. Justice Story’s dissent in Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the 
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), is the best-known of a long series of vested-rights 
cases that prominently featured Whig ideology and economic arguments, see id. at 584 (Story, J., 
dissenting). 
 38. Among the many state vested-rights cases with dissents in the antebellum era, which 
present the opportunity for highlighting disjunctions between Whig and Democrat ideology, are 
Fisher v. Cokerill, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.) 129, 133 (1827) and Commercial Bank of Rodney v. 
Mississippi, 12 Miss. (4 S. & M.) 439 (1845). 
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study made possible by quantitative methods. For instance, although 
there are some prominent Whig jurists—Justice Joseph Story and 
Judge Lemuel Shaw come to mind—a systematic study may provide a 
sense of how much the political doctrine of one party appears in the 
reasoning of the adherents of the other party. A systematic study may 
provide a better understanding of whether there was a unified judicial 
mind on such a critical and highly contentious area as vested rights. Did 
Democrats and Whigs largely think alike on vested rights, or, as one 
might expect from studying the statements of Democrat and Whig 
politicians, did they think differently? One way to approach this 
question is to look at several vested-rights opinions that were decided 
by Southern state supreme courts almost simultaneously during the 
Civil War. In 1864, the Confederate Congress passed a statute that 
made men who had already provided a substitute for military service 
subject to the draft. The statute was challenged in several states as a 
violation of the property rights of the men who provided substitutes. 
Five state supreme courts issued nearly simultaneous opinions on this 
issue. All upheld the statute; only one judge dissented. Those opinions 
contain recurrent issues of law, economics, and politics, and they 
provide a view of how Democrat judges reasoned differently from 
Whig judges. The Democrats were more comfortable retreating to 
arguments about the state’s power to compel service than were the 
Whigs, who took narrower approaches to the question and narrowly 
construed the initial “contract."39  
Some important quantitative work of this kind has been done 
already by those looking at judges’ use of economic analysis in the 
nineteenth century.40 A substantial body of work already considers 
 
 39. One might contrast, for instance, the Georgia opinion, Daly v. Harris, 33 Ga. Supp. 38 
(1864), written by Whig Justice Charles F. Jenkins, which construed narrowly the contract, with 
the bolder arguments of Democratic justices Mathias Manly of North Carolina and John Phelan 
of Alabama, see Gatlin v. Walton, 60 N.C. (Win.) 325, 333 (1864); Ex parte Tate, 39 Ala. 254, 255 
(1864). For some initial explorations, see Alfred L. Brophy, The Intersection of Property and 
Slavery in Southern Legal Thought: From Missouri Compromise Through Civil War chs. 3, 6 
(June 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 40. Dean David Levi reminds us that, although Judge Posner recommends that judges 
modify the law in ways that produce societal benefit, it is a mighty difficult task to know how a 
change might affect society: “{J}udges who think that they know what is sensible or beneficial 
merely by dint of education or intellect are just as formalist as the ‘legalists’ to the degree that 
they rely upon a fixed set of theories of human nature, economics, history, or political economy 
out in the ether to deduce rules of law, rather than building such rules from the ground up by 
responding to the particular facts of a particular situation and dispute.” David F. Levi, Autocrat 
of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1805 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
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whether judges self-consciously seek economic efficiency (or utility, to 
use the parlance of the antebellum United States). But my hope is to 
look more quantitatively across a spectrum of decisions to answer the 
question: to what extent was the “rule of law” understood to be a stable 
or a dynamic construct? It is an issue of identifying facets that can be 
quantified and aggregated so that we can have a fuller picture of a very 
complex system of thought and action. As we begin to understand how 
judges thought, perhaps that can illuminate “how judges think.” 
 
 
 
 
 
THINK (2008)). This critique is increasingly raised against law-and-economics interpretations of 
the common law: judges may not have known how their decisions would affect welfare. See, e.g., 
Gillian Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 616 (1992). 
